Édouard Albert Roche (French: [edwaʁ albɛʁ ʁɔʃ]; 17 October 1820 – 27 April 1883) was a French astronomer and mathematician, who is best known for his work in the field of celestial mechanics. His name was given to the concepts of the Roche sphere, Roche limit, and Roche lobe. He also was the author of works in meteorology.
Science and math
Yuri Kondratyuk
Yuri Vasilievich Kondratyuk (real name Aleksandr Ignatyevich Shargei, Russian: Алекса́ндр Игна́тьевич Шарге́й, Ukrainian: Олександр Гнатович Шаргей) (21 June 1897 – February 1942) was a Soviet engineer and mathematician. He was a pioneer of astronautics and spaceflight, a theoretician and a visionary who, in the early 20th century, developed the first known lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR), a key concept for landing and return spaceflight from Earth to the Moon. The LOR was later used for the plotting of the first actual human spaceflight to the Moon. Many other aspects of spaceflight and space exploration are covered in his works.
Kondratyuk made his scientific discoveries in circumstances of war, repetitious persecutions from authorities and serious illnesses.
“Yuriy Kondratyuk” is a stolen identity under which the author was hiding after the Russian revolution and became known to the scientific community.
Gerard Kuiper
Harold Urey
Olivine
Victor Goldschmidt
Goldschmidt classification
Évariste Galois
Évariste Galois (/ɡælˈwɑː/; French: [evaʁist ɡalwa]; 25 October 1811 – 31 May 1832) was a French mathematician and political activist. While still in his teens, he was able to determine a necessary and sufficient condition for a polynomial to be solvable by radicals, thereby solving a problem standing for 350 years. His work laid the foundations for Galois theory and group theory, two major branches of abstract algebra, and the subfield of Galois connections. He died at age 20 from wounds suffered in a duel.
Bertrand Russell
Russell’s paradox
In the foundations of mathematics, Russell’s paradox (also known as Russell’s antinomy), discovered by Bertrand Russell in 1901, showed that some attempted formalizations of the naïve set theory created by Georg Cantor led to a contradiction. The same paradox had been discovered in 1899 by Ernst Zermelo but he did not publish the idea, which remained known only to David Hilbert, Edmund Husserl, and other members of the University of Göttingen. At the end of the 1890s Cantor himself had already realized that his definition would lead to a contradiction, which he told Hilbert and Richard Dedekind by letter.
According to naive set theory, any definable collection is a set. Let R be the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. If R is not a member of itself, then its definition dictates that it must contain itself, and if it contains itself, then it contradicts its own definition as the set of all sets that are not members of themselves.
Principia Mathematica
The Principia Mathematica (often abbreviated PM) is a three-volume work on the foundations of mathematics written by Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell and published in 1910, 1912, and 1913. In 1925–27, it appeared in a second edition with an important Introduction to the Second Edition, an Appendix A that replaced ✸9 and all-new Appendix B and Appendix C. PM is not to be confused with Russell’s 1903 The Principles of Mathematics. PM was originally conceived as a sequel volume to Russell’s 1903 Principles, but as PM states, this became an unworkable suggestion for practical and philosophical reasons: “The present work was originally intended by us to be comprised in a second volume of Principles of Mathematics… But as we advanced, it became increasingly evident that the subject is a very much larger one than we had supposed; moreover on many fundamental questions which had been left obscure and doubtful in the former work, we have now arrived at what we believe to be satisfactory solutions.”
Hilbert’s program
In mathematics, Hilbert’s program, formulated by German mathematician David Hilbert in the early part of the 20th century, was a proposed solution to the foundational crisis of mathematics, when early attempts to clarify the foundations of mathematics were found to suffer from paradoxes and inconsistencies. As a solution, Hilbert proposed to ground all existing theories to a finite, complete set of axioms, and provide a proof that these axioms were consistent. Hilbert proposed that the consistency of more complicated systems, such as real analysis, could be proven in terms of simpler systems. Ultimately, the consistency of all of mathematics could be reduced to basic arithmetic.
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, published in 1931, showed that Hilbert’s program was unattainable for key areas of mathematics. In his first theorem, Gödel showed that any consistent system with a computable set of axioms which is capable of expressing arithmetic can never be complete: it is possible to construct a statement that can be shown to be true, but that cannot be derived from the formal rules of the system. In his second theorem, he showed that such a system could not prove its own consistency, so it certainly cannot be used to prove the consistency of anything stronger with certainty. This refuted Hilbert’s assumption that a finitistic system could be used to prove the consistency of itself, and therefore anything else.